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Abstract— A model-based windowed chi-squared procedure
is proposed for identifying falsified sensor measurements. We
employ the widely-used static chi-squared and the dynamic
cumulative sum (CUSUM) fault/attack detection procedures as
benchmarks to compare the performance of the windowed chi-
squared detector. In particular, we characterize the state degra-
dation that a class of attacks can induce to the system while
enforcing that the detectors do not raise alarms (zero-alarm
attacks). We quantify the advantage of using dynamic detectors
(windowed chi-squared and CUSUM detectors), which leverages
the history of the state, over a static detector (chi-squared)
which uses a single measurement at a time. Simulations using
a chemical reactor are presented to illustrate the performance
of our tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been significant interest and work in the
broad area of security and privacy of cyber-physical systems
(CPSs), see for example [1]-[6]. This topic investigates the
properties of conventional control systems in the presence
of adversarial disturbances. Control theory has shown great
ability to robustly deal with disturbances and uncertainties.
However, adversarial attacks raise all-new issues due to
the aggressive and strategic nature of the disturbances that
attackers might inject into the system. Moreover, large-
scale control systems are often geographically distributed
and so now depend heavily on communication networks for
monitoring and coordinating physical processes. The use of
communication networks makes these systems more prone
to false data injection attacks [7], i.e., between transmission
and reception of data, attackers may inject signals to data
coming from the sensors/controller to the controller/process.
It is therefore important to quantify what the attacker can
do to the system given the process dynamics, the controller
structure, and fault detection scheme.
In this manuscript, we focus on a class of attacks that
are not detected by the given detection mechanism, which
we refer to as zero-alarm attacks. Because these attacks
occur without being detected by the operator, it is important
to characterize the impact that they may induce on the
system performance. In particular, we consider attacks on
LTI stochastic systems equipped with standard Kalman-
filter based fault/attack detection procedures. The main idea
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behind these schemes is the use of a Kalman-filter to
forecast the evolution of the system state. This prediction
is compared with sensor measurements. If the difference
between what it is measured and the prediction (referred
to as the residual) is larger than expected, there might be
a fault in or an attack on the system. There exist many
well-known techniques which may be used to examine the
residuals and subsequently detect faults/attacks. For instance,
Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT) [8], [9], Cu-
mulative Sum (CUSUM) [10], [11], Generalized Likelihood
Ratio (GLR) testing [12], Compound Scalar Testing (CST)
[13], etc. Each of these techniques has its own advantages
and disadvantages depending on the scenario. Here, we focus
on the a particular case of CST, the so-called windowed
chi-squared change detection procedure. The windowed chi-
squared procedure considers a moving sum of a function
of the residuals over a sliding window. This detector is a
popular choice for fault detection and a number of groups
now use it for attack detection [14], [15], [16], [17], [18].
It benefits from a history of observations, which makes
it more adaptive than the one-shot version, the static chi-
squared detector. However, as its name implies, it retains
much of the analytic tractability of the static chi-squared
detector, leveraging a large body of work on the chi-squared
distribution. We discuss the performance of the windowed
chi-squared detector in comparison to the static chi-squared
and the dynamic CUSUM detectors in terms of performance
degradation induced by zero-alarms attacks. The trade-offs
affecting the performance of the windowed chi-squared are
also explored.
II. BACKGROUND
We consider stochastic discrete-time linear time-invariant
(LTI) systems of the form:{
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk + vk,
yk = Cxk + ηk,
(1)
with state xk ∈ Rn, control input uk ∈ Rm, measure-
ments yk ∈ Rp. Such systems arise, for example, from
a stochastic continuous-time LTI plant sampled with time-
invariant sampling (h ∈ R>0) at time-instants tk := kh.
The matrices F and G, of appropriate dimensions, are then
the sampling dependent matrices representing the discrete-
time state and input matrices, respectively. The C matrix
captures the mapping from states to measurements. The
vector vk ∈ Rn represents additive system noise, i.i.d zero-
mean Gaussian random noise with covariance matrix R1
and ηk ∈ Rp represents measurement noise, i.i.d. zero-
mean Gaussian random noise with covariance matrix R2.
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We assume that the pair (F,C) is detectable and (F,G) is
stabilizable.
In this work, we consider the scenario that the actual
measurement yk can be corrupted by an additive attack,
δk ∈ Rp. At some point in the process of measuring and
transmitting the output to the controller the attacked output
becomes
y¯k = yk + δk = Cxk + ηk + δk. (2)
If the attacker has access to the measurements, then it is
possible for the attack δk to cancel some or all of the original
measurement yk - so an additive attack can achieve arbitrary
control over the “effective” output of the system.
As our approach leverages a fault-detection approach, we
require an estimator of some type to produce a prediction
of the system behavior. In this work we use the steady state
Kalman filter
xˆk+1 = Fxˆk +Guk + L(y¯k − Cxˆk), (3)
where xˆk ∈ Rn is the estimated state. The observer gain L
is designed to minimize the steady state covariance matrix
P := limk→∞ Pk := E[ekeTk ] in the absence of attacks,
where ek := xk− xˆk denotes the estimation error. Existence
of P is guaranteed since the pair (F,C) is assumed to be
detectable [19]. Next, we define the residual sequence rk
rk := y¯k − Cxˆk, (4)
which evolves according to{
ek+1 =
(
F − LC)ek − Lηk + vk − Lδk,
rk = Cek + ηk + δk.
(5)
In the absence of attacks (i.e., δk = 0), it is straightforward
to show that the rk random variable falls according to a zero
mean Gaussian distribution with covariance [20]
Σ = E[rkr
T
k ] = CPC
T +R2. (6)
Anomaly detection relies on identifying deviations from
this nominal distribution. While in theory it is possible to
aggregate enough samples to reconstruct a sample distribu-
tion and compare this with the nominal distribution, this
approach would be extremely slow. Instead, detectors are
designed to make decisions to raise alarms based on much
less information.
A. Detection procedures
An anomaly (including faults and attacks) in a dynamical
system can be defined as a deviation of measurements
away from those predicted by the estimated state. Anomaly
detection uses the residual rk (difference between what
is measured and estimated). If the residual is larger than
expected, or specifically larger than a decision threshold,
there might be a fault in or attack on the system. Several
types of detectors exist; this work extends our past findings
to the popular windowed chi-squared detector.
The performance of a detector is related to its ability
to correctly identify true anomalies (quantified by the true
positive rate) and its ability to avoid raising alarms when
there are no anomalies (quantified by the false alarm rate).
Understanding the trade-off of these two rates is critical to
assessing the quality of a detector. Toward this aim, it is
important to be able to tune detectors to achieve different
points along the receiver operating characteristic curve. This
is one of the main outcomes of our past work and also what
we contribute in this paper with respect to the windowed chi-
squared detector. To help quantify these values, we define
the run length K as the number of measurements needed
(without anomalies present) such that the detector raises an
alarm:
K := min{k ≥ 1 : Sk > τ}, (7)
where Sk denotes the decision variable of the detector. The
expected value E[K] is known as the Average Run Length
(ARL) and is inversely proportional to the false alarm rate
of the detector A, i.e., A = 1/ARL.
1) Static chi-squared detector: The chi-squared detector
uses a quadratic form of the residual to test for substantial
variations in the covariance and expected value of the error
between the observed and estimated outputs. This quadratic
so-called distance measure has several advantages over the
arguably simplest detector that simply compares the absolute
error to a threshold. Beyond testing for changes in the
spread of the residual distribution, the chi-squared distance
measure zk = rTk Σ
−1rk provides an analytically tractable
distribution. Since rk ∼ N (0,Σ), the zk random variable,
as the sum of the squares of normally distributed random
variables, falls according to the chi-square distribution. Since
rk ∈ Rp, this chi-squared distribution has p degrees of
freedom. The chi-squared detector is summarized as follows:
for given a threshold α ∈ R>0 and the distance measure
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk{
zk ≤ α no alarm−−−−→
zk > α
alarm−−−−→ k∗ = k,
(8)
alarm time(s) k∗ are produced. The Σ−1 factor in the defi-
nition of zk rescales the distribution (E[zk] = p, E[zkzTk ] =
2p) so that the threshold α can be designed independent of
the specific statistics of the noises vk and ηk; instead it can
be selected simply based on the number of sensors (i.e., the
dimension of the output, p). The following lemma indicates
how to select the threshold α to achieve a desired rate of
false alarms.
Lemma 1: [20]. Assume that there are no attacks to the
system and consider chi-squared detector, with threshold α ∈
R>0, rk ∼ N(0,Σ). Let α = α∗ := 2P−1(1−A∗, p2 ), where
P−1(·, ·) denotes the inverse regularized lower incomplete
gamma function, then A = A∗.
2) CUSUM detector: CUSUM (Cumulative Sum) is a
sequential analysis technique which is used to aggregate the
error over an adaptive window to protect the system against
small, but persistent, attacks [11]. Given a chosen distance
measure zk (here we consider the quadratic distance measure
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk, but it is possible to drive the CUSUM
with any other choice of distance measure), the CUSUM
procedure evolves as follows: for given threshold τ ∈ R>0,
bias parameter b ∈ R>0, and initial cumulative sum S1 = 0{
Sk−1 ≤ τ no alarm−−−−→ Sk = max(0, Sk−1 + zk − b)
Sk−1 > τ
alarm−−−−→ Sk = 0, k∗ = k − 1.
(9)
Effectively the test sequence Sk accumulates the distance
measure zk and alarms the triggered when Sk exceeds
the threshold τ . The test is reset to zero each time Sk
becomes negative or exceeds τ [11]. Since zk ≥ 0, the
bias parameter b prevents the inherent growth due to the
sum of a nonnegative number. Intuitively, the zk distribution
should be shifted by its mean, i.e., b ≥ E[zk] = p such that
E[zk − b] ≤ 0; this is proved rigorously in [20]. For the
tightest detection b ≈ p. This same article provides similar
selection of the threshold τ to achieve a desired false alarm
rate as present above for the chi-squared detector, however,
due to the nonlinear dynamics of the CUSUM statistic (9)
there is no closed form solution (however, the proposed
heuristics can be made arbitrarily accurate).
B. Zero alarm attacks
Zero alarm attacks, introduced in [20],[21], represent a
powerful attacker model which allows us to characterize the
worst case steady state impact an attacker can have. Zero
alarm attacks are then useful for system design because
it allows operators to understand the extent of damage
an attacker can cause if the attacker chooses to remain
beneath the threshold of detection. While other attack models
are possible zero alarm attacks provide a useful and clear
benchmark. Hidden attacks, which allow attackers to raise
alarms as long as the alarm rate matches the false alarm
rate of the detector, are also a useful benchmark, however,
we have shown that such attacks can lead to arbitrarily
large state deviations unless additional detection methods are
implemented [22], [23]. Additional detection methods then
confuse the original objective of our work: to assess how
various detectors yield different attacker capabilities. Zero
alarm attacks are designed to maintain the entire attacked
test statistic (e.g., zk for a chi-squared detector; Sk for
a CUSUM detector) distribution at or below the detector
threshold (α and τ , respectively), effectively maximizing the
false negative rate (since the true positive rate is zero, i.e.,
the true attack is never detected).
In order to observe the effect of the attack on the system
state (not just on the estimation error), we need to close the
control loop with a controller. Here we consider the output
feedback controller uk = Kxˆk, where xˆk ∈ Rn is the state of
Kalman filter and K ∈ Rm×n denotes the feedback control
matrix. Then, the closed-loop system becomes{
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk +GKek + vk,
ek+1 = (F − LC)ek − Lδk − Lηk + vk.
(10)
When zero alarm attacks are designed against the chi-
squared detector the attack sequence becomes
δk = Cxˆk − yk + Σ 12 α¯ = −Cek − ηk + Σ 12 α¯, (11)
where α¯ ∈ Rp is any vector such that α¯T α¯ = α. Notice that
this attack either assumes the attacker has access to yk or has
the ability to replace the original measurement with another
value. The technology to inject a sensor attack typically also
enables the attacker to “sniff” communication packets (know
measurement values) and manipulate packets to add to the
value they carry or completely replace it. Thus these are
reasonable assumptions for quantifying worst case attacks.
This attack sequence leads the distance measure to become
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk
= (Cek + ηk + δk)
TΣ−1(Cek + ηk + δk)
= α,
which does not raise alarms by the chi-squared detector with
threshold α.
Lemma 2: [20]. Consider the chi-square detector and let
the sensors be attacked by the chi-squared zero-alarm attack
sequence (11). If ρ[F ] < 1, where ρ[·] denotes spectral
radius, then limk→∞ ‖E[xk]‖ = γχ2 , where
γχ2 :=
∥∥∥(I − F −GK)−1GK(I − F )−1LΣ 12 α¯∥∥∥. (12)
Similarly, for the CUSUM detector, the zero-alarm attack
sequence is given by
δk =
{
−Cek − ηk + Σ1/2τ¯ , k = k∗,
−Cek − ηk + Σ1/2b¯, k > k∗,
(13)
where b¯ ∈ Rp (resp., τ¯ ∈ Rp) is any vector such that b¯T b¯ = b
(resp., τ¯T τ¯ = τ ) and k∗ is the starting attack instant. The
first step of this attack sequence saturates the test statistic
Sk = τ and the subsequent steps maintain the statistic at the
threshold.
Lemma 3: [20]. Consider the CUSUM detector and let
the sensors be attacked by the CUSUM zero alarm attack
sequence (13). If ρ[F ] < 1, then limk→∞ ‖E[xk]‖ = γCS,
where
γCS :=
∥∥∥(I − F −GK)−1GK(I − F )−1LΣ 12 b¯∥∥∥. (14)
III. WINDOWED CHI-SQUARED DETECTOR
Our past work has identified how to tune the chi-squared
and CUSUM detectors to achieve desired rates of false alarm.
We also quantified the effect that attackers can have on
the system state while remaining underneath the detection
limit of these detectors. While chi-squared represents one
of the most popular detector choices in literature due to its
simplicity and analytic tractability, our past work has also
shown some advantages of the dynamic CUSUM detector to
maintain sensitivity to low-amplitude but long-term attacks.
Because the CUSUM bias b is typically selected smaller
than the chi-squared threshold α, the attacker capabilities
are much reduced using a CUSUM detector since b < α
implies γCS < γχ2 .
A compelling middle-ground option is provided by the
windowed chi-squared detector, which incorporates a sliding
window that sums the distance measure over the window
interval. This detector maintains most, if not all, of the
analytic tractability of the (static) chi-squared detector, while
providing enhanced detector sensitivity. On a theoretic level
it provides a way to understand the effect of the length
of the window on attacker capabilities, since a window
of length one recovers the static chi-squared and letting
the window length grow longer resembles some aspects
of the CUSUM detector (without the reset characteristic).
Formally, the windowed chi-squared detector is summarized
as follows: for given threshold β ∈ R>0, distance measure
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk, and test statistic
wk =
k∑
i=k−l+1
zi =
k∑
i=k−l+1
rTi Σ
−1ri, (15)
the detector compares{
wk ≤ β no alarm−−−−→
wk > β
alarm−−−−→ k∗ = k.
(16)
Here, the moving sum of zi is taken over a sliding window
[k−`+1, k] of length `. The extension to appropriately tune
the windowed chi-squared detector is similar to Lemma 1.
Theorem 1: Assume that there are no attacks to the system
and consider the windowed chi-squared detector with thresh-
old β ∈ R>0 and rk ∼ N (0,Σ). Let β = β∗ := 2P−1(1−
A∗, p`2 ), where P−1(·, ·) denotes the inverse regularized
lower incomplete gamma function, then A = A∗.
Proof : By construction, for all i ∈ N, zi are independent
chi-squared variables with p degrees of freedom. Thus, wk is
the sum of ` independent chi-squared variables. The sum of
two independent chi-squared variables with p and q degrees
of freedom, respectively, is a chi-squared variable with p+q
degrees of freedom [24]. Hence, the windowed chi-squared
statistic wk falls according to a chi-squared distribution with
p` degrees of freedom. The cumulative distribution function
is then given by F(w) = P (p`2 , w2 ), where P (·, ·) is the
regularized lower incomplete gamma function. The false
alarm rate is simply the portion of the wk distribution that
falls in the tail beyond the threshold β
A = pr(wk > β) = 1−F(β) = P
(
p`
2
,
β
2
)
. (17)
Inverting this relationship to solve for β yields the result. 
Next, to quantify an attacker’s capabilities under a win-
dowed chi-squared detector, we formulate the zero-alarm
attack sequence. Recall that a zero-alarm attack devises an
attack sequence such that the test statistic saturates and is
maintained at the detection threshold, i.e., for the windowed
chi-squared detector we design δk such that wk = β. Recall
the definition of the windowed chi-squared statistic
wk =
k∑
i=k−`+1
(Cei + ηi + δi)
TΣ−1(Cei + ηi + δi). (18)
To saturate wk = β, we select δi = −Cei− ηi + Σ 12 δ¯i, then
wk =
k∑
i=k−`+1
δ¯Ti δ¯i = β. (19)
This characterization of δ¯k leaves some ambiguity as did
our definitions of α¯, b¯ and τ¯ in (11) and (13). Because the
windowed chi-squared detector is summed over the `-length
time window, it is possible to design an infinite array of
different δ¯k profiles such that wk = β. For example the
following time-varying attack sequence satisfies wk = β:
δ¯k =
{
β¯, (k − k∗) mod ` = 0,
0, otherwise,
(20)
where
β¯ :=
{
β¯ ∈ Rp|β¯T β¯ = β} . (21)
However, both chi-squared and CUSUM detectors implement
an attack sequence that does not vary with time. Therefore,
to maintain an equitable comparison between the detectors,
we select a static attack sequence
δ¯k = δ¯ =
β¯
`
, (22)
with β¯ as defined in (21). Empirically, we observe that this
static attack generates the largest steady-state state deviation,
however, we leave this proof for future work. With this
attack, the closed-loop dynamics (10) becomes
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk +GKek + vk,
ek+1 = Fek − LΣ 12 β¯
`
− Lηk + vk.
(23)
Theorem 2: Consider the windowed chi-squared detector
and let the sensors be attacked by the zero-alarm attack
sequence (22). If ρ[F ] < 1, then limk→∞ ‖E[xk]‖ = γ`χ2 ,
where
γ`χ2 :=
∥∥∥∥(I − F −GK)−1GK(I − F )−1LΣ 12 β¯`
∥∥∥∥, (24)
and β¯ as defined in (21).
Proof: By construction and assumption, ρ[F + GK] < 1
and ρ[F ] < 1. This implies that (I −F −GK) and (I −F )
are invertible, respectively; hence, system (23) has a unique
equilibrium, in expectation, given by{
E[xk] = x¯ := (I − F −GK)−1GK(I − F )−1LΣ 12 δ¯,
E[ek] = e¯ := (F − I)−1LΣ 12 δ¯.
Substituting (22) yields the matrix in γ`χ2 . To ensure this
equilibrium is attractive, we use (23) to show that the
evolution of the differences E[ek]− e¯ and E[xk]− x¯ satisfy
E[xk+1]− x¯ = (F +GK)(E[xk]− x¯)−GK(E[ek]− e¯),
E[ek+1]− e¯ = F (E[ek]− e¯).
Since ρ[F + GK] < 1 and ρ[F ] < 1, the equilibrium
[x¯, e¯]T is exponentially stable, i.e., limk→∞E[ek] = e¯
and limk→∞E[xk] = x¯. The Euclidean norm on Rn is a
continuous function from Rn to R≥0 [25]. It follows that
limk→∞ ‖E[xk]‖ = ‖ limk→∞E[xk]‖ = ‖x¯‖. 
IV. WORST CASE STEADY-STATE DEVIATION
In previous work, we identified the steady-state state devi-
ation due to aggressive zero-alarm attacks for the chi-squared
and CUSUM detectors. Here we developed an analogous
result for the windowed chi-squared detector. The static
nature of the zero-alarm attacks creates a similar structure
for all of these steady-state bounds. In particular if we define
the matrix
M := (I − F −GK)−1GK(I − F )−1LΣ 12 ∈ Rn×p, (25)
we observe the bounds can be expressed as γ = ‖Mδ¯‖,
where δ¯ becomes δ¯ = α¯ for the (static) chi-squared detector,
δ¯ = b¯ for the CUSUM detector, and δ¯ = β¯/` for the
windowed chi-squared detector with window length `. The
definitions of α¯, b¯, and β¯ only stipulate that their respective
norms should be α, b, and β. In the following result we
identify, based on the matrix M , the “direction” δ¯∗ ∈ Rp
that yields the worst (largest) steady-state state deviation. In
this context of attacks, this provides the relative weighting
(susceptibility) of each sensor to achieve the attack with the
most damage.
Proposition 1: Let λ1 denote the largest eigenvalue of the
positive semidefinite matrix MTM with corresponding unit
eigenvector ν1. Then:
• α¯ = α¯∗ := √αν1 satisfies α¯T α¯ = α and maximizes γχ2 .
• b¯ = b¯∗ := √bν1 satisfies b¯T b¯ = b and maximizes γCS.
• β¯ = β¯∗ := √βν1 satisfies β¯T β¯ = β and maximizes γ`χ2 .
Proof : We prove this result in the context of the static
chi-squared, however, the proof is identical for the other
detectors. The asymptotic bound γχ2 can be written in terms
of M as γχ2 = ‖Mα¯‖. Then, to maximize γχ2 , we have to
find the α¯ solution of the optimization problem:
arg max
α¯T α¯=α
‖Mα¯‖ = arg max
α¯T α¯=α
(
α¯TMTMα¯
)1/2
, (26)
which has the same solution α¯ ∈ Rm as
arg max
α¯T α¯=α
α¯TMTMα¯. (27)
The matrix MTM is positive semidefinite by construction;
hence, it is symmetric and its eigenvalues, λi, are nonnega-
tive and real. Let the eigenvalues be ordered as λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥
· · · ≥ λp. This means we can write α¯ in terms of the
orthonormal eigenvectors νi of MTM :
α¯ =
p∑
i=1
aiνi → MTMα¯ =
p∑
i=0
aiλiνi, (28)
where ai are the coefficients of the expansion with α¯T α¯ =
α =
∑
a2i . Exploiting the orthonormality of the eigenvectors,
we see that
α¯TMTMα¯ =
p∑
i=0
aiλiα¯
T νi =
p∑
i=0
a2iλi. (29)
Since
∑
a2i = α and λ1 is the largest eigenvalue, the choice
of ai coefficients that maximize this objective sets a1 =
√
α
and ai = 0, i = 2, . . . , p. This makes α¯∗ =
√
αν1. 
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Fig. 1: The contour curves indicate values of window length
` and state deviation β/` that correspond to equivalent false
alarm rates A ∈ {1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, 80%}. As the
window length increases the damage (state deviation), for
all false alarm rates, converges to p (here p = 1).
A. Detector comparison
The formulations of the steady-state expectation of the
state deviation in (12), (14), and (24) along with the com-
mon structure exploited in Proposition 1 now permit us to
easily make comparisons between these three detectors. In
particular, we define α¯, b¯, and β¯ as in Proposition 1, which
identifies that γχ2 , γCS, and γ`χ2 are different only due to the
differing values of
√
α,
√
b, and
√
β/`.
Typically low false alarm rates A are selected to limit
the number of alarms raised in the attack-free case. In this
context, α > b ≈ p. At the same time, β/` < α (if
β/` ≥ α there would be no advantage of using a window
length greater than 1). With these assumptions, we observe
an ordering of state deviation: γχ2 > γCS and γχ2 > γ`χ2 .
The windowed chi-squared detector performs an interesting
function role and to better determine its performance against
the CUSUM, we develop the following result.
Proposition 2: Given a windowed chi-squared detector
with window length ` and a CUSUM detector with bias tuned
to b = p, the following is satisfied:
lim
`→∞
γ`χ2 = γCS, (30)
where p is the dimension of the measurement vector.
Proof : The central limit theorem provides the asymptotic
properties of the sample average S` = 1` (X1 + X2 +· · · + X`), given a sequence of ` i.i.d. random variables,
X1, X2, . . . , X`, each with expected value µ and finite
variance σ2. The central limit theorem states that
√
`(S`−µ)
converges in distribution to N(0, σ2) as ` approaches infinity.
Here, the windowed chi-squared procedure computes then
the sum (not the average) of chi-squared random variables
Xk = zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk with p degrees of freedom, since
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Fig. 2: Degradation of ||xk|| due to zero-alarm attacks.
Attacks are induced at k = 51. Opaque curves denote the
worst case zero-alarm attacks specified by Proposition 1.
Transparent curves denote zero-alarm attacks in which δ¯ =
1p×1. In both cases, the thicker line represents a moving
average of the stochastic norm of the state using a moving
window of 20 steps.
rk ∼ N(0,Σ) and rk ∈ Rp. Since Xk = zk is chi-square
distributed with p degrees of freedom, it has mean µ = p
and variance σ2 = 2p. Thus, by the central limit theorem, the
sample average approaches N(µ, σ
2
` ) = N(p,
2p
` ). From this,
the sum (not average) approaches N(`µ, `σ2) = N(p`, 2p`).
Note that determining the threshold β to satisfy a false
alarm rate A for the asymptotic sum distribution N(p`, 2p`)
is equivalent to identifying the threshold β/` to satisfy the
same false alarm rate for the asymptotic sample average
distribution N(p, 2p` ). Notice that the latter distribution ap-
proaches mean p with shrinking variance. In the limit, the
variance goes to zero, which means the threshold (in fact
the entire distribution) collapses down to the mean value p.
Thus for large values of window length `, the value of β/`
to satisfy a chosen false alarm rate (in fact any alarm rate)
converges to p.
Substituting β/`→ p into γ`χ2 and substituting b ≈ p into
γCS then yields the result. 
It is worth noting that this result is system independent,
and thus purely a comparison of the detectors in the limiting
case. Considering the case when p = 1, in Fig. 1, we show
the nonlinear trade-offs between the selection of β and ` to
maintain the same false alarm rate A. This plot demonstrates
the convergence of the distribution as `→∞ to be centered
at p = 1 with diminishing variance.
The reader might notice that the chi-squared and
windowed chi-squared detectors can achieve better-than-
CUSUM values of state deviation by selecting a large false
alarm rate (≈ 40% or larger). Using a detector with such high
false alarm rates overlooks the practical issue of dealing with
a large number of alarms. It also does not consider the effect
an attacker can have if they execute attacks that leverage the
part of the distribution beyond the threshold for their attacks.
Zero-alarm attacks do not quantify the extra damage caused
by such “hidden” attacks [22].
B. Demonstration
To validate our theoretical results, we use a model devel-
oped in [26], [27] for a well stirred chemical reactor with
heat exchanger. The state, input, and output vectors of the
reactor are:
x(t) =

Co
To
Tw
Tm
 , u(t) =
 CuTu
Tw,u
 , y(t) =
CoTo
Tw
 , (31)
Co: Concentration of the chemical product.
To: Temperature of the product.
Tw: Temperature of the jacket of water of heat exchanger.
Tm: Coolant temperature.
Cu: Inlet concentration of reactant.
Tu: Inlet temperature.
Tw,u: Coolant water inlet temperature.
The original nonlinear model is linearized about the origin
x(t) = 04×1 and the system matrices are given below. In Fig.
2, we show the deviation of the state norm ‖xk‖ subject to
attacks that begin at k = 51. We show the result of two
different sets of zero-alarm attack sequences. One set (in
opaque) represents the deviation due to worst case attacks
generated in accordance to Proposition 1. The second set of
attacks (semi-transparent) are zero-alarm attacks with δ¯ =
1p×1. All sensors are used for detection and the detectors
are tuned for a false alarm rate of 5%, A = 0.05. Following
our tuning results, we select α = 7.81 (static chi-squared
threshold), β = 21.03 (windowed chi-squared threshold, ` =
4), β = 179.58 (windowed chi-squared threshold, ` = 50),
and b = 3 (CUSUM bias; CUSUM threshold is not needed
for these simulations, but for completeness it is τ = 0.86).
These lead to predicted steady state errors shown in dashed
lines in Fig. 2.
In each case, the steady-state deviation represents the
“damage” that an attacker can be confined to as long as the
attacker wishes to raise no alarms (to hide from detection).
As expected, the largest steady-state deviation is permitted
by the static chi-squared detector. As the window length
increases (to ` = 4 and ` = 50 in the figure), the deviation
decreases approaching the smallest deviation, accomplished
by the CUSUM detector. An attacker is most effective in
dealing damage by selecting the worst case attacks described
in Proposition 1. Changing the definition of δ¯ has the same
effect to the damage allowed by each detector (due to the
similar structures of the respective γ definitions); here the
worst case attack causes 163% higher damage than the naive
attack with δ¯ = 1p×1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have employed the windowed chi-square
procedure for attack detection. For the case of zero alarm
attacks, we identified the limiting steady-state state deviation
F =
0.0273 0 0 00 0.0268 0.0001 0.00680 0.0004 0 0.0018
0 0.0619 0.0055 0.2478
 , G =
0.0271 0 00 0.2665 0.00010 0.0005 0.0276
0 0.0761 0.0114
 , L =
0.0033 0 00 0.0033 00 0 0
0 0.0147 101.3810
 , R2 = 100× I3,
C =
1 0 0 00 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
 , K =
 3.2856 −0.7139 −0.8301 1.4940−0.0244 5.0912 2.0507 −3.6645
0.2707 54.5562 99.8275 −117.5190
 , R1 =
13.8785 0 0 00 13.6531 0.0141 2.11220 0.0141 1.3808 0.2623
0 2.1122 2.623 34.1805
 .
allowed by each type of detector: windowed chi-squared,
static chi-squared, and CUSUM. The window chi-squared
provided insight into the role that the window length plays
in dynamic detectors. In particular, we show that the per-
formance of the windowed chi-squared detector approaches
that of the CUSUM as the window length gets longer.
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